ANGAE ahn-gay, fog in Korean

Let them
steal fog.

We seal your files so every stolen copy decrypts into a convincing lie. The thief gets a full document. They just can't tell which one is true.

Decrypting sealed file attempt 001
Key tried 9f3a1c wrong
OperationHALLA-7
Unit7th Mobile Company
Time07-14 22:00
GridCK-2043
RouteR-7 mountain bypass
Escort2 recon drones + 1 APC

Every wrong key returns a different, complete document. None of them announce that they are fake.

01

All of this was encrypted.

Every organisation on this list encrypts its data at rest. Most are required to by law. The records sold anyway.

Gov & defense records listed for sale · source: StealthMole 0

Encryption protects a file where it sits. It does nothing once the file and the key walk out together.

02

If you can't stop them taking it,
make it worthless once taken.

03

Wrong key. Perfect lie.

Normal encryption fails loudly. The attacker sees garbage, knows the key was wrong, and tries the next one. Ours fails silently: a wrong key returns a complete, ordinary-looking document, so there is nothing to learn from and no reason to keep going.

the real key is , try that too
Normal encryption ·

·

The attacker knows this key was wrong, so they try the next one. Given enough attempts, the real file eventually appears and announces itself.
ANGAE ·

·

The attacker learns nothing. Every attempt looks like a success, so there is no signal telling them to keep going.

Where it sits in your stack

Your app saves a file
seal = Seal(unit_key, data)
store(seal)
// one line. same database,
// same file size.
Someone reads it back
out = Decode(seal, key_given)
return out
// right key: the truth.
// anything else: a fake.
You delete it
drop(seal)
// the truth and every
// possible fake go together.

Juels and Ristenpart, EUROCRYPT 2014. Built on peer-reviewed work from IEEE S&P 2012, ACM CCS 2013 and RAID 2024.

04

One original. One seal.

We don't stockpile fakes. Each wrong key generates one on the spot.

Original

  • mdOPORD.md
  • csvmanifest.csv
  • jsonescort.json

Sealed · 1 file

0 reachable decryptions

05

Same model. Same question.
The only difference was fog.

Without fog

0

Identified everything. Unit, time, coordinates, route.

With fog

0

Failed. It called the data deliberately obfuscated, then guessed wrong anyway.

We don't need to deceive perfectly. We need them to hesitate, and to burn satellite passes and drone sorties re-verifying what they already stole.

06

For us, the fog isn't there.

One correct key. Every decoy collapses.

Clearance is the key. ANGAE derives it from Defense PKI and GPKI, so there is no second key system to run.

07

Why now.

Every acquisition in this market so far has paid for intrusion detection. Nobody has been paid yet for protecting the data itself.

0

Cyber deception market by 2030, growing 12%+ a year from $2.4B today.

  • 0 Proofpoint, to Thoma Bravo, 2021
  • 0 Attivo, to SentinelOne, 2022
  • 0 Thinkst ARR, bootstrapped and profitable

And the target is moving

Drones and robots don't get hacked. They get shot down and carried off, with their training data and model weights still aboard. ANGAE seals at write time, so captured hardware hands over fog like everything else.

  • Physical AI
  • On-device AI
  • Agentic AI
  • Assume breach
  • Zero trust
  • Data sovereignty
  • Post-quantum
  • Confidential computing
  • Dual-use defense

Market sizing: Mordor Intelligence, DataM, The Insight Partners. Deal values: company filings and TechCrunch. 2030 estimates range $3.8B to $5.7B; the conservative upper bound is shown.

08

The era of higher walls is over.

Once the stolen copy can't be trusted, stealing it stops being worth the trip.

Early access

ANGAE